Route anomalies, beyond simple leaks, are occurring on the order of tens of thousands a year. These may be accidents. There is anecdotal evidence that indicate many of these are in fact crimes. There are case studies that illustrate the use of these for national intelligence. Any given anomaly could be an accident, a crime, or an attack. To understand the nature of routing anomalies we offer an empirical investigation using multiple regression and unsupervised learning to analyze anomalies over a four-year period. If BGP anomalies are a result of limited technical competence, then countries with low levels of education, few technology exports, and less expertise should be over-represented. If BGP anomalies are crime, leveraged by criminals for profit, then economic theories and analytical approaches from criminology should show statistical significance. Or, if BGP anomalies are primarily used by national intelligence agencies to attack either internal dissidents or other countries, then the presence of conflict and measures of quality of governance are possible indicators. We examine anomalies as likely incompetence, potentially ecrime, or intelligence operations using macroeconomics and leveraging three theories from criminology, as well as global measures of technology adoption. We found that exports of technology were not statistically significant, undermining the argument for incompetence. We found support for the possibility that anomalies are driven by crime, specifically for the guardianship and relative deprivation theories of crime. In addition to these findings from regression analysis, clustering indicates that civil conflict and surveillance are associated with the disproportionate origination of routing anomalies.
Introduction
Routing security is a complex technical, social, and economic problem. A given route anomaly may be an accident, a crime, or an attack. Understanding the economics and political dynamics of a threat can inform effective defenses; for example, as shown by the efficacy of targeting payment processors in the battle against pharmaceutical spam [1] .
We do know that BGP anomalies appear to be increasing [2] . One possible explanation is that as the Internet expands, more routers and more operators means more routing errors. The expertise of individual operators is also increasingly diverse. Network engineers sometimes argue that the problem is that there is a decrease in the amount of overall "clue" among operators. Failures of technical competence may be inadvertent, but they can still be harmful.
In this work we distinguish between leaks and other anomalies. A notable leak was that of a small Australian ISP in 2012; one which took the continent "down under" down for hours. In this case, a small ISP obtained service from one ISP and back-up service from the other. This small ISP then announced every route from each of these larger ISPs to the other. As larger ISPs have a preference for routing through their own customers, the two larger ISPs updated and began to dump all their traffic on the new, confused customer that had announced all the routes [3] . This outage was immediately apparent, and recovery was completed within hours. The ISPs can be said to have suffered the outage, both Telstra and Dodo, as did the rest of the continent. This is a straight-forward failure of human factors and operational policy. It is so common as to have its own moniker: fat fingers. We are focused here on hijacks and other anomalies, not route leaks. But because of the history of route leaks and challenges of usability in routing we cannot reject the hypothesis that anomalies other than leaks are a result of errors.
Beyond operator and organizational error, another explanation for anomalies is that disruptions and subversions can be used by criminals for profit. When an entity purposefully misrepresents its location in a path, rather than claiming to own a destination or inadvertently leaking, the errors are less obvious. With this attack, traffic continues to be delivered, and such a routing configuration could remain stable for long periods. In addition, short bursts can be difficult to detect. In one example, short bursts of BGP hijacks leveraged the lack of authentication between miners of the digital currency bitcoin and their coordinating mining pools to steal up to $9,000 a day. (Bitminers form collaboratives where their shared processing power leverages economies of scale in bitcoin transactions. Normally, coins that are created are transferred to the collective pool shared by the collaborators.) Using BGP to hijack traffic to hosting providers, including Amazon, the attacker filtered the content for miners and directed them to place the coins under the attacker's control. After twentytwo bursts over four months, the hijackers were detected [4] . Another possible criminal use of hijacks is to pollute paths to DNS resolvers. Pollution of paths to DNS resolvers is an attack that has been widely observed and monetized [5] although the attacks typically have not used hijacking. The fact that control plane disruptions have not been more widely commoditized may either reflect the inherent resilience of BGP or the shape of things to come. Anecdotal observations of individual hijacks and data pollution also indicate that control plane attacks are worthy of attention. For example, [6] provides a six vignettes of malicious hijacks combining for-profit and national intelligence incidents. The author describes these as examples of a "vast" phenomena used in spam and malware campaigns but provides no quantification.
Beyond crime, anomalies have been created by nations for political ends. A famous political control plane incident was initiated by Pakistan in 2008, where Pakistan identified several YouTube videos as sufficiently problematic as to block all of YouTube. An internal address for YouTube was intended to be announced within Pakistan by Pakistan Telecom. Instead, it spread across northern Africa and Europe, with a duration of hours [7] . The intention to block within Pakistan was political, yet the anomaly itself could be considered a human factors problem. The efficacy of attacks of nation-states on the reachability of the Internet for their residents was further illustrated during the Arab Spring, as rapid drop-offs for Egyptian and Libyan populations were easily observable but less easily repairable [8, 9] .
In another more subtle case, Facebook traffic was routed through China. Facebook updates were not encrypted at that time. Thus, a significant amount of global traffic was routed via a nation where Facebook adoption is remarkably low [10] . At that time there were more than 100 000 American troops in two active conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan whose updates were routed through the Great Firewall of China. The Department of Defense noted that a major concern during that time was troops inadvertently leaking information via posts about their activities on Facebook [11] , exactly the traffic that appears to have been hijacked.
The perception that such attacks are constant, as well as the concern that these attacks may be undetected and unreported, motivate calls for a ubiquitous cryptographic solution [12] . Yet, as the experience with certificate authorities issuing rogue X.509 certificates shows, political attacks and sheer incompetence are difficult to prevent and detect with an all-or-nothing cryptographic model of trust. Sometimes authorities are necessarily trusted for purposes of access, interoperability, and availability even when their intent or competence does not indicate trustworthiness.
In a nutshell, the nature and distribution of control plane anomalies are rife with open questions, and some of these are political and economic questions which can inform the design of security solutions. Here we begin to address the question of the role of ecrime and politics in BGP anomalies by using macroeconomic analysis and unsupervised learning.
This analysis is based on 322 466 incidents that were identified not only as anomalies but also as possible hijacks by Argus [13, 14] . This data may include false positives from route flapping, organizational changes, or anomalous but not purposeful responses to changes in the control plane from outages or congestion. We do not assert in any way that all of these are malicious activity. Rather our investigation is based on the argument that the possibility of BGP attacks systematically being used for profit and for surveillance cannot be dismissed. BGP control plane attacks as a tool for ecrime or espionage has implications for investments, policy, possible targets, and possible solutions. Solutions that mitigate risk from one possible source should not exacerbate the other. For example, lack of expertise as a source of anomalies cannot be dismissed as an explanation out of hand. Increased technical complexity for security could exacerbate this problem.
In addition to the results of the statistical analysis itself, we offer a framing through which to view the threat by drawing on the growing literature on ecrime. Our analysis found that the density of secure Internet servers, quality of national governance, and density of broadband subscribers are significant while per person wealth and IT workforce (as measured by exports) were not found to be statistically significant. Following our identification of the significant macroeconomic variables via standard regression, we report results of unsupervised machine learning. We report on a geographically-grounded cluster analysis which shows highly developed and developing countries as two distinct clusters. The goal of the cluster analysis was to identify potential differences in the nature of the relationships across clusters after the regression results identifying the existence of statistically significant relationships. This complementary analysis found that there are two major clusters that indicate the importance of national conflict. Before turning to our analysis and results, we discuss related work in empirical analysis of ecrime and control plane anomalies.
Related work
It is an open debate as to whether routing anomalies, such as prefix hijacks, are primarily crime as opposed to incompetence or intelligence activities. To explore these as crime, we can learn from empirical analysis of other forms of ecrime. Empirical analysis by Kanich et al. [1] examined values chains in pharmaceutical spam, where the payment services processors were identified as the weakest link. This technical analysis enabled an effective policy response. Moore, Clayton and Anderson examined temporal patterns and value chains in phishing and theft [15] , and provided guidance for coordinated law enforcement responses. Christin's analysis of underground markets [16] illustrated the stability of the supply of online narcotics and estimated the amount of revenue for operators of a marketplace. An analysis of linguistic groupings in online criminal marketplaces by Afroz et al. [17] provided a window into the geographic and political distribution of online crime. Closer to this work, Clayton [18] describes pollution of registry databases where attackers claim official ownership of IP space in order to subvert automatic filtering of invalid route announcements. These are then leveraged for spam and malware campaigns.
One challenge in evaluating anomalies and hijacks is identifying them. Different approaches have been proposed to identify hijacks. These variously rely on the analysis of the control-plane information (by examining inconsistencies at the router level [19, 20] ), data-plane information (by detecting a drop in the traffic reaching the victim [21] ), or their combination (by using detected anomalies in the control-plane to inform traffic measurements [14] ). Different technical approaches have been implemented in industry (e.g., Dyn Research http://research.dyn.com/) and in the academy, e.g., Cyclops [22] .
Detection that is based in control-plane information analysis examines Multiple Origin AS conflicts [23, 24, 19] . This approach relies on looking at unique prefixes that are originated from multiple ASes. Khare et al. [23] developed a method that is based on correlating suspicious routing behavior and comparing it with past routing activity. Kruegel et al. [24] proposed an approach to detect malicious inter-domain messages by analyzing BGP updates. In particular, they verified route advertisements for consistency with local network topology. The approach presented by Lad et al. [19] relied on timely notification of the origin of AS changes, i.e., it is based on information provided by the owner of the prefix. These types of methods have been shown be effective in identifying very large events but at the same suffer from a large number of false positives.
In the case of data-plane information methods, the criteria for detection is based on monitoring changes in Internet traffic [25, 21] . For example, Zheng et al. [25] introduced a method to detect traffic path changes by sampling from multiple vantage points. Relying on this methodology, the work by Zhang et al. [21] proposed a system (iSPY) which relies on the identification of prefix unreachability from a set of peer ASes. In contrast with control-based methods, this type of approach leads to a better a time-resolution scale (a higher sampling frequency). Traffic monitoring changes are mostly deployed at the AS neighborhood level, and have not been proven at scale.
To deal with the disadvantages of exclusively control-and data-plane based methods, hybrid solutions have been proposed [26, 14] . The fundamental idea behind hybrid methods is to use control-based detection frameworks to inform data-plane measurements. In that respect, the work by Hu and Mao [26] proposed to identify anomalous routing updates as those where there is data plane evidence that conflicts with the control plane update. In this type of approach, the detection delay can be on the order of minutes. Similarly, the work by Shi et al. [14] proposed Argus. In contrast with the approach provided in [26] , Argus correlates data-plane signatures with reported control-plane anomalies. This approach allows detection of a wider range of anomalies than those given by bad origin and path. In this analysis we use data from Argus. We provide more details on the data we use in Section 3.3.
This work was also informed by insights from empirical studies of ecrime. The work by Hiran et al. [27] analyzed the impact of the China Telecom incident (where China Telecom claimed a significant of the the address space [28] ) in terms of the origin of prefixes that were announced. Their results suggest that most of the hijacked prefixes correspond to registered organizations in the U.S., followed by organizations in China, South Korea, Australia and Mexico. In particular, after detailed inspection, they found that the U.S. shows fewer hijacked prefixes based on the global distribution of attacks. On the other hand, countries in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g., China, South Korea, Australia) were more affected by the incident based on the global distribution of attacks. This suggests that the hijack incidents have a direct impact in the immediate neighborhood.
On the other hand, with respect to the underlying factors that are associated with the production of BGP hijacks, there is related research that investigates the relationship between short-lived BGP hijack alerts and spam sources. In particular, the work by Ramachandran and Feamster [29] reported significant amounts of spam received from IP addresses that correspond to short-lived BGP routes, in particular, hijacked prefixes. Similarly, in [26] Hu at al. found a strong correlation between BGP hijack alerts with spam sources from [29] . The evidence of these types of correlations provides an interesting indirect link between understanding the causal factors that are related to the origin of hijacks. These findings suggested that BGP hijacks may be becoming part of the commoditized ecrime ecosystem.
Spam itself has been subject to significant economic analysis. Nation and region of origin have been found to be relevant in analyses of spam for commercial purposes, e.g., Microsoft [30] and academic researchers, e.g., Garg [31] . An early macroeconomic analysis of spam looked at the role of ISPs and included variables from the governance of the nation associated with the ISP. In that work [32] van Eeten at al. considered the efficacy of specific industry and national policies in the spam ecosystem. Similarly, the use of deep packet inspection has been examined by Asghari et al. [33] as a political and technical phenomena across different ASes. The economics of malware illustrates the significance of state-level variables, including the economic variables we consider in the following [34, 35] . Earlier work also analyzed the technical signatures around particular Internet censorship events [8] . Our model also draws on the association between the production of spam and crime in [31] which explored spam using different criminology theories. This previous body of work informed the selection of independent variables for this analysis, as well as guiding our classification of ASes as grounded in a specific jurisdiction.
In summary, the work presented in this paper builds on previous research to explore how macroeconomics indicators correlate with the production of online crime around the world. We apply these approaches to BGP anomalies, using Argus data that includes hijacks but not leaks. We further examine the possibility that it is lack of technical skills rather than malevolence which is causing the increase in such anomalies, again using empirical analysis of macroeconomic indicators.
Methods
We performed a longitudinal cross-country empirical analysis of the macroeconomic factors that correlate with the number of IP prefixes associated with potentially malicious control plane events. That is, we focus on the originators and not the targets of BGP control plane incidents as identified by Argus. In Section 3.3 we provide details on the data source and types of incidents we examine. Otherwise in the following sections we refer to the data on hijacks and other anomalies excluding route leaks as simply "anomalies" or "hijacks."
We identified the macroeconomic variables that have been found to be relevant to global analyses of ecrime which are grounded in traditional theories of crime [36] as well as prior research focused on understanding the economic incentives behind malware [31] . We then used standard regression techniques -linear regression using ordinary least squares-to examine these theoretically important independent variables. As a dependent variable, we considered the number of hijacked IP prefixes that are originated in a particular country grounded in the dataset provided by Argus. We analyzed data over a nearly four-year period, from 2011 to 2014. The goal is to evaluate if macroeconomic analysis, including that indicated by theories of ecrime, can inform the discussion of risks in the control plane.
Following our identification of the significant variables, we use cluster analysis to further explore the relationships among those variables. We identify two clusters, one of affluent highly developed countries and one of less wealthy nations. We illustrate the importance of governance indicators in the number of anomalies originated in a given country.
Independent variables
The independent variables used in this research are based in traditional theories of crime, in particular: (i) routine activity theory, (ii) economic deprivation, and (iii) social support (also known as altruism theory). These variables have been instrumented using publicly available data from the World Bank.
1 Although there is a dispute over the way some of these measures are implemented, biases in these measures are likely consistent across countries and over time.
The World Bank provides a consistent and systematic measure of country level macroeconomic variables and has been used widely in economic, crime, and jurisprudence research [37] . Equally importantly, the World Bank provides uniform and consistently available measures that are likely to be reproduced by other researchers. Table 1 lists all the independent variables used in the analysis.
The routine activity theory of crime states that the probability of a crime is a function of motivated offenders, available targets, and lack of guardianship [38] . The first independent factor is availability of users, i.e., a larger population of Internet users is more likely to produce more hijack attacks. This means that we make no assumptions about the distribution of motivation between categories or classes of users, but rather assume with more users there is a larger pool of people who could be motivated to commit online crime. To determine if this is a significant variable, we considered the number of fixed broadband subscribers (FBIS) in a given country. We normalize the number for comparisons across countries by evaluating the number of fixed Internet broadband subscribers per 100,000 people (FBISper100).
A second independent factor is guardianship. Guardianship has been modeled in other work as community oversight. High guardianship indicates that the community has and enforces norms of non-criminal and safe behaviors. In the case of online crime, this can be indicated by private investments in the existing ICT infrastructure. We operationalized this factor by using the measure of secure Internet servers (SIS) and SIS per million people (SISperM) to account for the differences in population. The World Bank defines SIS as "servers using encrypting technology in Internet transactions."
Economic deprivation theory suggests that crime is driven by blocked legitimate opportunities or economic deprivation [39] . This is the third independent factor. Certainly, the lack of economic availability encourages individuals to perform criminal activities if these are profitable. To measure this factor, we consider the GDP per capita by purchasing power parity (PPP GDP). The PPP GDP indicates the relative deprivation with respect to other countries given the low cost of global connectivity.
The social support or altruism theory posits that individual lack of economic resources can be alleviated by appropriate governance through public investments [40] . This is the fourth independent factor. The government influences take the form of subsidies or incentives for the adoption of technologies. Conceptually, when a governance environment encourages the adoption of technologies, it is also an environment that provides better and cheaper access to ICT technologies which slows the incentive for routing attacks. To capture this factor, we operationalized government support by using a subset of World Governance Indicators (WGI) [41] . In particular, we used (1) government effectiveness, (2) regulatory quality, (3) rule of law, and (4) control of corruption, i.e., perception of corruption within a country. Government effectiveness captures the perceived quality of the services, policy formulation, and the credibility of the governance. Regulatory quality refers to the perceived degree of alignment toward the development of the private sector. Rule of law measures the degree to which the legal framework is operationalized in practice. For example, corruption can decrease the effectiveness of the legal framework. Control of corruption measures the misuse of public power for private gain.
Finally, recall that one possible explanation of routing anomalies is a lack of technical competence. This is the fifth and last independent factor. Superior governance in the specific domain of information and communication technologies (ICTs) would be indicated by high levels of local expertise. Local expertise and ability in computing is commonly identified in macroeconomic analysis by higher levels of exports in those industries. To measure local skill, we used the percentage of exports of computer, communications, and other services (CCS). This measure is intended to quantify the degree to which a country has developed ICT markets. This is important because a bigger ICT market, for example, implies a larger number of personnel trained in basic security practices. In fact, hijacking routes requires a minimum level of expertise in security and minimum technological requirements to perform, particularly in comparison with simple email confidence scams such as advance fee fraud. In contrast, creating a route leak requires a lack of expertise or due care. As noted in discussion, strong evidence of guardianship may also be difficult to distinguish from high levels of competence. We acknowledge this as a limitation, yet the complexity of the problem the is not a reason for avoiding empirical analysis.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable corresponds to the number of unique affected IPv4 prefixes by country (based on the origin of the malicious prefix), i.e., each event corresponds to a prefix being rerouted. We depend upon the Argus dataset for the identification of anomalies. Our contribution is application of macroeconomics and clustering to previously existing data in order to obtain insight to the nature of anomalies. Based both on Argus' description of their practices and the sheer number of events reported, we can assume flapping is filtered out. That we found no significance for measures of national technical expertise further indicates that leaks were not inadvertently included. We do acknowledge that some BGP alarms might be due to benign BGP engineering practice or misconfiguration, including events specifically classified as anomalous in this data. The common characteristic of the incidents examined below is that the IP prefixes and ASes are used to divert Internet traffic. Neither sensor placement optimization nor creation of a large-scale dataset of anomalous routing events are contributions of this work. Instead we offer empirical analyses of strongly theoretically grounded models. Our augmented geolocation and R scripts are available upon request so others can use them and compare the results.
Datasets
For the purpose of this research, we compiled data over the 43 months from June 2011 to December 2014 from the Argus API, as of December 20, 2015 [13, 14] . The data are available for public download at http://argus.csnet1. cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/.
The data that we used relies on the output of the Anomaly Monitoring Module (AMM). The AMM is able to detect origin anomalies, adjacency anomalies, and policy anomalies. An origin anomaly is detected when an AS is advertising a prefix that it does not own. To do so, Argus maintains a database that tracks the expected origin of prefixes. To detect an adjacency anomaly, the AMM monitors changes in AS-path segments. Given the exponential number of pos-sible combinations of segments in the updates, the AMM module only verifies neighboring pairs and triplets in an AS-path. To detect policy anomalies, the AMM module takes into account the type of commercial relationship between ASes. Specifically customers are not expected to announce routes from their providers. Note that, by considering these three types of anomalies, the AMM is able to detect a wide range of hijacks and other events.
In the subsequent analysis, we only focused on reported "origin anomalies," i.e., those events that report a regular and a bad (malicious) origin at the same time for a particular prefix. Thus, each event that is used in the data set corresponds to a unique prefix being rerouted, i.e., an event does not include multiple prefixes (if the same prefix is announced again in a different event, it is counted as a different event). In addition, the size of the prefix does not have any effect in the counting process, i.e, we did not distinguish between prefixes length and threat them equally.
These data allow us to identify the anomalies based on the political jurisdiction of the originating ASes (i.e., the country in which the bogus route was announced). The mapping of IP addresses and ASNs has been widely used in industry [42, 43, 30] and academic macroeconomic research, e.g. [32] . Geolocation is an active research area, and improvements in geolocation could enhance this analysis. Our approach to location is grounded in concurrent industry practice and related research [44] . We inferred the mapping between ASes and country membership from a data set provided by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [45] . The geolocation data were also investigated over the fall of 2015 with multiple downloads of RIR data. One goal in implementing downloads was to avoid the "phony, yet plausible AS origins" that are used for ecrime. However, we did not evaluate every AS by hand. It is possible some RIR data hijacks did remain in our dataset, but a systematic bias is unlikely because we examined AS and geographical origin for every year (using current and historical data). A false claim to an IP addresses would have to remain stable for a long time to pollute our data. There would have to be a significant number of these to bias the results our analysis.
Most of these anomalies in the Argus database are short-lived, on the matter of seconds. Previous anecdotal discussions [6] described cases that appear to be both intelligence activities and criminal activities. Like the bitcoin miner attack, apparently criminal incidents are short-lived. Other than anecdotes, we have no basis for asserting that a short-lived hijack is a crime while a longlived hijack is evidence of international intelligence activity. Given that there is clearly malicious activity that occurs in short burst, we include all the data in our analysis rather than creating an arbitrary threshold.
Statistical model
We performed multiple linear regression. In particular, Equation 1 summarizes the behavior that we captured.
In Equation 1, A refers to the number of hijacked prefixes (i.e., the dependent variable). Every independent variable is captured by the factors AVA, SEC, ECO, LEG, and EDU respectively as we defined in Table 1 . The terms β 0 , . . . , β 5 are the regression coefficients of the model. In addition, is the error term. Equation 1 was evaluated using OLS regression. In an effort to validate the OLS assumptions, we examined the model for the (absence) of multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity.
To address the absence of multicollinearity in the predictors, we calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) per year and in the aggregate data. We found that the four indicators of WGI are highly correlated, i.e., government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption have VIF > 5 [46] . Thus, in the subsequent analysis, we combined all of these indicators into a single score by adding them up. We called this new variable WGI. For the remaining predictors, the VIF values did not indicate that multicollinearity is an issue, i.e., FBIS, FBISper100, SIS, SISperM, PPP GDP and CCS have VIF < 5.
We examined the distribution of the residuals of the model to check the absence of heteroskedasticity. We tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test, under the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed. For the model described by Equation 1, the test for the distribution of the residuals produced a p-value of 0.464. This suggests that we failed to reject the null hypothesis that residuals are normally distributed. In other words, there is not enough evidence in favor of heteroskedastic errors and the condition is satisfied. To avoid the regression being affected by particular outliers, we log transformed variables with a long-tail distribution. We determined these variables by examining their distributions in box plots and identifying outliers. The independent variables that were log transformed were (1) PPP GDP, (2) FBIS, (3) SIS, and (4) SISperM.
Similarly, given that the OLS regression makes additional assumptions, we explored the distribution of the dependent variable. In particular, OLS assumes that the dependent variable is continuous and normally distributed. In doing so, we tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test per year and in the aggregate. We found that the normality assumption was not satisfied, i.e., the pvalue ≈ 0. This indicates that the dependent variable is unlikely to be normally distributed. Thus, the dependent variable was log transformed to satisfy the assumptions underlying the linear regression.
Results
Here we describe how our results indicate that lack of technical expertise does not impinge the initiation of hijacks but the presence of conflict and the macroeconomic indicators of crime are statistically significant.
Recall that we are looking at initiators of routing anomalies excluding leaks but including hijacks. (We refer to these as "hijacks" or "anomalies" to confirm that we are not addressing leaks, that not all the data are hijacks although these are included, and for ease of readability.) Our overall goal is to provide an empirical analysis to better understand the nature of these anomalies specifically by determining the factors that explain the variance across countries in terms of origination of anomalies. The failure modes of X.509 PKI illustrate that the underlying trust model is best when it is well-aligned with the underlying threats, including economic and political threats. Here we report the results of our analysis of Argus' dataset. The details on their data compilation can be found in [13, 14] as well as above in Section 3.3. Above we detailed our approach so that organizations with proprietary datasets can repeat our analysis. We will also make out geolocation and R scripts available.
Given the wealth of data, a combination of statistical methods were applied. We used time-series analysis to examine significant trends in the data set. We found that the distribution of the number of hijacks per country is heavy-tailed and remained stable during the observation period (the majority of attacks are generated from some few countries). To test our hypothesis of the influence of macroeconomic factors in the variance of the number of attacks originating from a certain country, we used multiple linear regression. The model reveals that the leading factors that are associated with hijack events are guadianship, which is operationalized through the number of SIS, and governance, which was estimated by using the WGI. Finally, to further study the distribution of countries in the guardianship vs. governance plane, we analyzed the clusters that are formed. In particular, countries with poor governmental practices are also associated with a higher frequency of originated hijacks. A high frequency of hijacks also corresponds to the existence of national conflict.
Anomaly time series
The total number of IP prefixes that were effected by an anomaly for each year during the observation period is 54 087, 90 607, 105 600 then 72 172 for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively. The data have a surprising level of variance. In particular, there is an increase of 67.5% between 2011 and 2012, an increase of 16.5% between 2012 and 2013, and a decrease of 31.7% between 2013 and 2014. This suggests that although the number of effected prefixes has been growing since 2011, it suddenly dropped at some point in 2014.
To further investigate the decrease in the number of hijacks in 2014, we analyzed the time series of anomalies. Figure 1 plots the number of reported events during the observation period. The graph shows the number of hijacked IP prefixes in the period of study. The dashed line represents the LOESS fit. The shaded area corresponds to the 95% confidence interval of the regression model. In this figure, the data have very high variance. In particular, the number of hijacks spans four orders of magnitude. This means that reporting the average number of events is highly influenced by outliers and can be misleading. To take into account this constraint, we applied a non-parametric regression method, LOESS, to perform local regression and derive a non-linear fitted smooth curve (the dashed one) that models the trends in the time series. We also plot the 95% confidence interval of the regression line in the shaded area. Although the smooth curve does not reveal a significant trend, it is possible to infer that in 2014, there are two periods in which there are not records of incidents. These periods correspond to the days between January 3 to April 22 and May 22 to July 29. We iterated the analysis to confirm this empirically. The decrease in the number of incidents in 2014 is likely a result of some downtime because there appears to simply be missing data. Only Argus could confirm this; however, it offers one possible explanation. We cannot reject the explanation that hijacks have become more difficult to detect but find it unlikely. The rate of incidents appears to be increasing over time; however, missing data make this a less than certain observation. 
Anomaly distribution
To take into account the origin of the bad routes, we map the AS origin of the bad route to the corresponding country at which the AS is registered (based on a CAIDA data set) [45] . We then measured the corresponding number of incidents that were reported in any given country. Figure 2 shows the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of the number of incidents per country during the observation period. The distribution is heavy-tailed suggesting that the majority of the reported hijack incidents originated from a small set of countries. We determined the distribution that best fit the data by estimating param-eters for different possible distributions, and then evaluated the goodness of fit. Specifically, we examined the best fit parameters for the empirical distribution by using the maximum likelihood among a set of power-law, log-normal, and exponential parametric distribution candidates. They are very well known to be a good fit for heavy-tailed distributions. We followed the procedure explained in [47] . Second, we calculated the goodness-of-fit for the proposed distributions by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [48] . The KS test tests the hypothesis that two samples of data are drawn from the same distribution. In this case, we test if the observed distribution is statistically significantly different from the best fit of the parametric model. In particular, we computed the proportion of times that the test failed to reject the hypothesis that the distribution of compiled data and the synthetic data are drawn from the same distribution for a significance level of 0.05. In tests of 10 4 synthetic distributions, the analysis of the synthetic data under the power law model failed to reject the null hypothesis 99% of the cases, followed by log-normal at 98%, and exponential at 0%. From this analysis, we ruled out the exponential distribution as a potential candidate.
The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the CCDF of the best power law model for the aggregate date, including all observations between 2011 and 2014. The estimated parameters of the power law distribution are α = 2.13 for the scaling exponent and x min = 958 for the threshold at which the power law begins. Remember that a random variable X that follows a power law has a PDF (probability density function) given by P r[X = x] = x −α . Although the best fit is given by the power law distribution followed by a log-normal distribution, there is not enough evidence to entirely rule out the option of the log-normal distribution. Moreover, there are still some deviations from the dashed line in the tail, i.e., for countries with a large number of hijacks. We discuss this further in Section 5.
To determine how these distributions change over time (and the possible transition from one distribution to another), we applied the KS test to determine if the distribution of hijacks per country changes from one year to the next from 2011 to 2014. We found that there were no comparisons where we were able to reject the hypothesis that the distributions were the same (p-value 0.05). Figure 2 illustrates this fact by showing that the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) over the period of study is visually similar.
To further study the behavior of the countries that are the origin of the majority of the anomalies, we plot the distribution of these for countries that are in the upper 2.5% quartile of the distribution during a particular year. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the changes for the countries that are the origin of the majority of the anomalies. This shows the number of reported anomalies per year for those countries that are in the upper 2.5% quartile of the distribution for a specific year. Interestingly, the U.S. is the country to which the majority of the anomalies are attributed throughout the observation period. Brazil and India appear in three of the four years during the observation period, although their relative ranks change. Russia and Turkey appear twice. China and Romania each show up once. 
Regression analysis
We ran a multiple linear regression for the aggregate data during the observation period using the entire set of measures from 2011 to 2014. Remember that the target variable is the number of hijacked prefixes in a particular country. In particular, OLS was applied to Equation 1. Table 2 shows the OLS regression estimates. The model estimates and standard errors have been presented by taking heteroskedasticity into account. The linear regression quantifies the individual relative importance of a single feature when considering the effect of the others constant. There are three statistically significant factors, nominally, SIS, WGI, and FBIS, in order of decreasing importance. We did not count as a separate predictor SISperM because this is a normalized measure of SIS (an indirect measure). The coefficients of the OLS suggest that although there is a positive association between SIS and FBIS with the number of hijacked prefixes (i.e., countries with higher SIS and FBIS are more likely to produce more incidents), the association with WGI is negative (i.e., countries with poor governmental practices are more likely to produce more incidents). This analysis also suggests that our hypothesized macroeconomic factors explain a significant amount of variance in the number of incidents originated in different countries (approximately 75.3% with p-value ≈ 0). Given that SIS is a significant predictor, we further explore the relationship between the number of anomalies and the number of SIS by using the scatter plot in Figure 4 . This plot shows that there is a power relationship between the two variables (given by the linear tendency in a log-log plot) for both the aggregate data and for each the individual years. For the aggregate, the association between the two variables (in the log scale) has a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.79 which confirms the idea of strong association between the two variables. Figure 4 also reinforces the results of the OLS analysis. In other words, it sug-gests that countries with a high number of SIS are also the countries with a high reported number of anomalies. In this plot, we highlighted the country with the highest density of secure servers and the larger number of produced anomalies during the observation period, which was the U.S. every year. The top five countries in terms of number of SIS during the observation period remained the same: U.S., U.K., South Korea, Japan, and Germany. The U.S. reports half a million, with the others reporting on the order of a hundred of thousands. As we might expect from the positive association revealed in Figure 4 , the U.S. is the country with the highest number of SIS and the highest number of anomalies (see Figure 3) . Japan is the other country that reveals a similar pattern with respect to a positive association between the number of SIS and control plane anomalies. On the other hand, Germany, South Korea and the United Kingdom report a high number of SIS but here this does not corresponding to a larger number of anomalies (see Figure 5) .
To investigate the association between the number of SIS and WGI, we plot the relationship between these two variables for every country during the observation period. The result is shown in Figure 6 . Note that, we only consider the number of SIS and WGI because they are the most significant predictors in the regression, i.e., we do not explore the effect of FBIS. Although there is a positive association between SIS and the number of hijacked prefixes, and a negative one between WGI and the number of hijacked prefixes (see Table 2 ), the relationship between these two independent variables is exponential in the WGI (given by the linear tendency in the log-linear plot) both for the aggregate data and for each of the individual years. The correlation for the aggregated data has a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.68. This fact reinforces the idea of a strong association between the two variables. It also suggests that, given the data, it is more likely that countries with poor indices of governance also have a smaller number of SIS and vice versa. But more importantly, any change in the WGI of a country is exponentially amplified and reflected in the number of SIS. It appears that small changes in the perception of government practices result in significant changes in generation of anomalies, and thus significant changes in creation of risk in the global control plane. 
Cluster analysis
To account for differences in the anomalies per country given their technology infrastructure, we normalized this measure by the total number of ASes that belong to that country in a certain year. This transformation allows us to have a fair metric to evaluate the likelihood of a country being the origin of the anomalies based on their technological resources. Figure 7 illustrates the differences in the anomaly/ASes ratio across the SIS and WGI plane for 2011. A higher intensity (i.e., darkness) in the data points represents a higher anomaly/ASes ratio at the country level. The plot also depicts the contour of the two-dimensional density estimation of the distribution of the data points. We did not implement an aggregate cluster analysis for the entire period because of apparently missing data as shown in Figure 1 . We have implemented cluster analysis for 2012 and 2013 finding the same clusters and same outliers, despite the changes in rank shown in Figure 4 . The only difference is that Somalia was not an outlier in 2013. All graphs were remarkable for their similarity. The following discussion of cluster analysis applies to 2011-2013, with data missing in 2014, and 2015 subject to further analysis. As can be seen, there are two main clusters based on this distribution. The first cluster corresponds to countries with high WGI and more than 10 3 SIS, i.e., the first quadrant. Not surprisingly, the majority of the countries in this cluster are developed countries. The U.S. and South Korea are outliers of this cluster and are labeled in the plot (see Figure 7) . While the U.S. has a better WGI indicator and a larger number of SIS than South Korea; South Korea has a higher ratio of anomaly/ASes (which is represented by a darker point). Recall the U.S. and South Korea are outliers in all our cluster analyses. South Korea similarly has a higher ratio of hijack/ASes for all years.
The second cluster represents mostly countries with low WGI and less than 10 3 SIS, i.e., the third quadrant. The majority of countries in this cluster are developing countries. In particular, Comoros has been labeled in the plot with the highest ratio of anomaly/ASes during 2011. Somalia is an outlier of this cluster in 2011 and 2012. Somalia was not an outlier in 2013. It may be noted that Somalians have recently had some success in ecrime, however their technical expertise as observed is quite limited [49] .
Finally, we analyzed the evolution of the WGI for countries with poor governmental practices, such as low WGI and a limited guardianship, i.e., a relatively low number of SIS. We considered countries that have WGI between -7 and -3, which is 20% of the countries. We further filter that set to include only those where the number of SIS is between 0 and 10 (still in the third quadrant), and the anomaly/ASes ratio is greater than 1.5 (recall these are World Bank estimates of absolute numbers, not per population.) In comparison, the median ratio of anomaly/AS for the U.S. during the observation period is 1.5. Figure 8 shows the geographic location of the countries that satisfy these characteristics during the observation period (highlighted in red). Table 3 shows the evolution of the WGI of these countries during the observation period. Interestingly, most of these countries have been involved in civil protests and threats of civil war as has been reported in [8] . In particular, Syria has been (during the observation period) constantly categorized as a country with a high ratio of anomaly/ASes. Other countries in the Middle East that appear on this chart, Iraq and Yemen, also have been embroiled in conflict. The analysis highlights other countries in Africa including Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Guinea, and Liberia, as well as Timor-Leste in Asia.
Discussion
We have analyzed the routing anomalies identified by Argus after identification of jurisdiction of origin. We have evaluated the statistical significance of macroeconomic indicators corresponding to three theories of ecrime and those that correspond to likely technical expertise for each jurisdiction. This study has as a primary focus an empirical understanding of the variance of anomaly production at the cross-country level. Some limitations need to be taken into account before further discussing the results. The model relied on multiple lin- ear regression through OLS, but it does not identify the underlying mechanisms behind the regression estimates for the macro variables. Nor do we know why variables appear more predictive in some countries than in others. The results suggested by the statistical model are based on correlation, which is not an indicator of causality. In that respect, the aggregation and analysis of more features can partially but not wholly improve the understanding of causes in future research. We have offered theories of ecrime, governmental action, and technical competence as candidates for explanations of these correlations. These theories are well-grounded in the literature, motivating their selection, yet the results are in no way deterministic. We identified some patterns of interest in the data beyond statistical significance that could be partially explained by macroeconomic indicators. First, the overall results indicate that the concentration of anomalies originated in the U.S. is consistently the highest. This suggests that a solution that is deployed in the U.S. may have a disproportionate impact in the reduction of routing anomalies. It also indicates that policies which apply only in the U.S. may be effective despite the global nature of the Internet. The potential for high impact of technology and policy solutions is reified by observation of the two highlighted clusters. Second, we observed significant incidence of anomaly production in countries with poor governance practices and limited investment in security. Among these countries with a striking rate of anomaly production and poor government indicators, Syria is the only country that is highlighted during the entire observation period.
Focusing further on the cluster of countries with poor government practices, we identify that indicators of conflict occur more strongly than indicators of poverty, i.e., it is not all about economic deprivation or lack of technical expertise. This is revealed as we track the evolution of the WGI for countries in this cluster. Moreover, as we have shown in the analysis, the four dimensions of governance are not independent of one another [41] . In other words, although these variables measure different aspects of governance, they tend to be closely inter-related in a particular country. This is an important consideration because the original formulation of the WGI leverages other dimensions of governance such as voice and accountability, political stability, and absence of violence. This implies that the WGI indicator that we presented in this study is capturing some component of conflict in the highlighted countries. In other words, WGI can indicate surveillance of a nation's own people.
We found that the distribution of the number of anomalies is well-modeled by either a power law or log-normal distribution (see Section 4.2). As has been pointed out in [47] , in terms of data generation, it is arguably more reasonable to assume that the data are created by a log-normal process because of the distribution of ASes globally and within countries. The type of mechanisms that can be expected to produce these heavy-tailed distributions [50] identicates that power law and log-normal distributions are quite naturally associated. In particular, the generative mechanism behind hijacks has been attributed to multiplicative processes, in this case this means the more ASes the more we expect anomalies. This observation has also been discussed in [51] . Applicably, a multiplicative process is one that can be characterized by Gibrat's rule of proportionate growth stating that the proportional rate of growth of a firm is independent of its absolute size [52] . Thus, we can apply the analogy to model the size of the countries based on economic, guardianship, and availability factors. It is reasonable to expect the number of hijacks generated in a given country to be proportional to that country's macroeconomic indicators.
Overall, our analysis offers surprises in terms of the role of macroeconomic indicators in anomalies. Much, however, remains to be done. For example, it will be interesting to investigate whether consistent patterns in terms of anomaly production are observable at the level of ASes and ISPs. This would allow us to better understand the microeconomic factors that are responsible for the variance of anomaly production around the globe.
Finally, given that the statistical model relies on assumptions concerning the generation of observed data, the conclusions are also based on the quality of data that we have. It might be the case that the data is incomplete or prone to false positives. Thus additional analyses on other data sources should be compared with the results here.
Conclusion
Our analysis of BGP routing anomalies lends insight into hijacks as a geographical, economic, political, and technical challenge. We focused on the analysis of longitudinal cross-country macroeconomic data and its relationship with the frequency of produced routing anomalies. To do so, we collected a data set about BGP incidents from June 2011 to December 2014, and combined this with data from the World Bank. We provided statistical characterizations of the distribution of hijacks over the past four years. The higher level research question is if these are crime, and if so can we characterize these empirically as attacks? The specific hypotheses we address focus on determining the economic factors that explain the variance in the number of hijacks originated from different countries.
There appears to be a high and consistently increasing number of BGP incidents, specifically those that are potentially hijacks. Assuming the lack of data is in fact lack of data and not lack of incidents in 2014, we can expect hundreds of thousands more incidents in the coming years. While there are false positives, these incidents are not route leaks and cannot be reasonable be assumed to results from simple technical incompetence. In fact our analysis found no systematic evidence that these anomalies are a result of incompetence measured by exports of information and communications technologies (as opposed to leaks, which we did not explore). Other than errors, two remaining explanations are crime and national intelligence. Both of these can be quite difficult to observe. They can also be difficult to distinguish. We found evidence for both possibilities.
In order to answer the question if BGP attacks are crime, we use the tools of criminology informed by previous work in empirical analyses of ecrime. Specifi-cally, we built on previous macroeconomic work in online crime using the factors that have been found to be significant in predicting malware, spam, and crowdsourced criminal labor (e.g. CAPTCHA solving). We created a model and evaluated data over time to determine if variables associated with routine activity theory (fixed broadband subscribers, secure Internet servers), economic deprivation theory (GDP per capita by PPP), or structural theory (governance and education) were significant over multiple years. We found that one variable for two of the three theories was significant. Specifically, density of fixed broadband subscribers, and secure Internet servers were significant, supporting routine activity theory. Governance indicators were significant, supporting a structural theory of crime.
We found evidence for the possibility that BGP anomalies (including hijacks) are a new method of ecrime, one that is detected tens of thousands of times each month. If BGP hijacks are a common ecrime vector and follow the patterns of other online crime, the misdirection and filtering of information may be commoditized and become an industry.
A further cluster analysis showed mixed evidence for crime and national intelligence. South Korea and the U.S. are known for being targeted by specific types of ecrime. South Korea is notable for its high level of virtual goods, thus is a target for virtual theft. The U.S. is consistently highly ranked as being the most popular target and a most popular source of common online crime, such as phishing and spam. The U.S. maintains its role as an outlier in this analysis; however, South Korea has a greater density of anomalies per AS. The other cluster, of nations with low numbers of secure Internet servers, the increase in density of anomalies per operating autonomous systems shows a striking overlap with nations with civil disputes over the time period studied. While the relatively small number of countries prevents meaningful statistical analysis of these few nations, the overlap between national conflict and anomalies is striking. Given the extremely large investment in national intelligence and national defense as well as current involvement in conflicts overseas by the U.S., its presence in anomalies can also be seen as supporting the national intelligence explanation.
In summary, we found evidence for two of the three proposed explanations for anomalies: crime or attack. Any solution to the challenge of these should consider both possibilities, particularly solutions which indicate that nation states can be roots of trust. A solution that mitigates one source of hijacks should not exacerbate the other. Otherwise such anomalies may not remain, in fact, anomalous.
Empirical analysis such as the one conducted in this paper can offer insights about the vulnerability of regions in the world in terms of routing security. In future work we will evaluate anomalies by duration, destination and other candidate features to estimate which are for profit, and which are grounded in the originator's concepts of patriotism.
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